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Abstract
Deepfake is one notorious application of deep learning research, leading to massive
amounts of video content on social media ridden with malicious intent. Therefore
detecting deepfake videos has emerged as one of the most pressing challenges
in AI research. Most state-of-the-art deepfake solutions are based on black-box
models that process videos frame-by-frame for inference, and they do not consider
temporal dynamics, which are key for detecting and explaining deepfake videos
by humans. To this end, we propose Dynamic Prototype Network (DPNet) – a
simple, interpretable, yet effective solution that leverages dynamic representations
(i.e., prototypes) to explain deepfake visual dynamics. Experiment results show
that the explanations of DPNet provide better overlap with the ground truth than
state-of-the-art methods with comparable prediction performance. Furthermore,
we formulate temporal logic specifications based on these prototypes to check the
compliance of our model to desired temporal behaviors.
1 Introduction
While artificial intelligence (AI) plays a major role in revolutionizing many industries, it has also
been used to generate and spread malicious misinformation. In this context, Deepfake videos –
which can be utilized to alter the identity of a person in a video – have emerged as perhaps the
most sinister form of misinformation, posing a significant threat to communities around the world
[49, 8, 19, 21, 46, 48]. As deepfakes become pervasive, ascertaining the trustworthiness of a video
and making a determination of its authenticity becomes critical.
To address this challenge, a series of excellent work has been conducted on detecting deepfakes
[47, 31, 1, 38]. While they have achieved good progress towards the prediction task to a certain
extent, there is still significant room for improvement. First, even though existing work focus on the
authentication problem, very few of them address the interpretability issue. That is, explaining why
a model predicts a certain video as real or fake, which can be crucial for maintaining trustworthy
content dissemination. Second, humans detect a deepfake video by examining the unnatural dynamics
caused by the distortions induced by the generation model [24, 37, 59]. Yet most state-of-the-art
deepfake detection techniques analyze a potential video frame-by-frame, and have not explored these
temporal dynamics [35, 38]. As a result, there is a need for an interpretable deepfake detection
technique which considers temporal dynamics and at the same time gives insight into the temporal
inconsistencies in deepfake videos.
To this end, we propose DPNet – an interpretable prototype-based neural network that captures
dynamic features, such as unnatural movements and temporal artifacts, and uses them to explain
why a particular prediction was made. Specifically, DPNet works by first learning the prototypical
representations of the temporal inconsistencies within the latent space, utilizing spatial-temporal
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Figure 1: Examples of static vs. dynamic explanations for deepfake videos. Qualitatively, seeing
temporal artifacts allow a human judge to quickly determine whether a video is real or fake. Red
circles indicate regions of interest. Best view as GIFs (See Appendix C).
information from the inputs. Then, it makes predictions based on the similarities between the
dynamics of a test video and the small set of learned dynamic prototypes. Lastly, the dynamic
prototypes are then intermittently projected to the closest representative video patch from the training
dataset, yielding an immediate human-understandable interpretation of the learned prototypes.
The primary advantages of DPNet are as follows:
• Faithful explanations via case-based reasoning: DPNet follows a case-based reasoning
approach that utilizes previously learned dynamics - as evidence (i.e cases) - to tackle a new
unseen testing video. This helps the model to explain why a certain prediction was made, in
a way that is reflective of the network’s underlying reasoning process.
• Visual dynamic explanations: DPNet provides explanations in the form of visual dynamics,
via the learned prototypes, that are principled, accessible, and easy for humans to understand.
• Temporal logic specifications: DPNet automatically learns the dynamic prototypes, which
can be used to formulate temporal logic specifications that check the robustness of the model
and verify whether it conforms to desired temporal behaviors.
2 Related Work
Deepfake detection: A prominent line of work for deepfake detection focuses on hand-crafting facial
features from the video, such as eye color and missing reflections [31], 3D head poses [54], and facial
movements [2, 6]. However, these approaches do not scale well to larger and more sophisticated
deepfakes. To address this problem, researchers propose to leverage advances in image detection
via convolutional neural networks (CNNs) and process the deepfakes frame-by-frame. Examples
include spatial pyramid pooling module to detect resolution-inconsistent facial artifacts [27], applying
mesoscopic features [1], ImageNet-based [12] model XceptionNet [38] (which achieved state-of-
the-art results by fine-tuning on deepfake datasets), and variants of Capsule Networks [35, 34]. All
these methods process deepfake videos frame-by-frame and do not consider temporal dynamics in
the videos. However, it is known that humans detect a deepfake video by examining the unnatural
dynamics caused by the distortions induced by the generation model [24, 37, 59]. Even though
several attempts have been made to explore multi-modal and temporal information in deepfakes (e.g,
two-stream CNNs [58], recurrent neural networks [39], and inter-frame dissimilarities using optical
flow [4]), their performance is inferior to that of frame-based methods.
Interpretable neural networks: One popular approach to explaining deep neural networks is
posthoc analysis via gradient and perturbation-based methods [42, 55, 5, 41, 44, 40, 33, 13, 53];
however, they do not simplify the inherently complex underlying architectures. Instead, another line
of research tries to build networks that are interpretable by design, with a built-in to self-explain.
The advantage of this approach is that the interpretability is presented via units of explanation —
general concepts and not necessarily raw inputs. This can be seen in the work of [3] for basis concept
learning and [23, 26, 32] for case-based reasoning and prototype learning. Chen et al. [11] proposed
learning prototypes for image classification to make predictions based on similarity to class-specific
image patches. However, this type of interpretability has not been brought to video classification to
leverage the rich temporal information within videos.
2
Figure 2: DPNet architecture for deepfake detection.
Although deep learning-based video classification models have been developed for video understand-
ing [57, 29, 57, 51, 16], there is much to be desired in terms of interpretability, especially when
compared to intrinsically interpretable models. In contrast, our proposed approach directly captures
temporal artifacts in deepfakes as dynamic prototypes and uses them as visual explanations to explain
predictions, which is specifically important for deepfake detection.
Safety verification: Neural networks (NN), in general, cannot provide any guarantees regarding
model safety, leading to critical failures, one being adversarial examples [45, 17]. The importance
of safety verification, especially in critical domains such as healthcare or autonomous driving, was
highlighted when the discovery of such attacks prompted many lines of work in robust verification
in ML [25, 22, 18, 20, 52, 10, 30]. To further reason about safety and robustness in time, temporal
logic has been broadly in previous work [7, 36, 43, 15], and recent work in using temporal logic to
verify time-series and NN-based perception system have shown promises [50, 13]. The dynamic
prototypes from our interpretable models provide a convenient vehicle for us to formulate temporal
logic specifications for videos and reveal valuable insights into the model’s compliance to desired
temporal behaviors.
3 Dynamic Prototype Network
We introduce our Dynamical Prototype Network (DPNet), the loss function, and the training procedure
in this section. In addition, we highlight the steps that our network took to predict a new video, and
how those exact steps can be interpreted in a human-friendly way.
3.1 DPNet architecture
The proposed architecture is shown in Figure 2. Formally, let V = {(vi, yi)}Ni=1 be the video dataset,
where vi be a deepfake video sequence of length Tvi , and yi ∈ {0, 1} is the label for fake and real.
As shown here, DPNet consists of four components: the feature encoder f , the prototype layer p, the
fully-connected layer w, and the robustness temporal logic checker.
Feature encoder f(·): The feature encoder f encodes a processed video input xi ∈ R224×224×S
into a hidden representation z ∈ RH×W×C . Here the input xi to the encoder f is formed by stacking
one RGB frame with precomputed optical flow fields between several consecutive frames, yielding
S channels (Figure 2a). We let the input to the DPNet be a fixed-length T < Tvi , and randomly
selected the initial starting frame for xi. This allows us to explicitly describe the motion of facial
features between video frames, while simultaneously presenting the RGB pixel information to the
network. Furthermore, since the optical flow fields can also be viewed as image channels, they are
well suited for image-based convolutional networks. The feature encoder f outputs a convolutional
tensor z = f(xi) of shape (H,W,C) that is forwarded to the prototype layer.
Prototype layer p(·): The network learns m prototype vectors p1,p2, . . . ,pm of shape (1, 1, C)
in the latent space, each corresponds to a dynamic prototype in the architecture; see section 3.2.1
for the learning procedure. The prototype layer p computes the squared `2 distance between the
prototype vectors pj and each patch (of shape (1, 1, C)) of the encoded input z. Thus generating
m distance maps of shape (H,W ). The shape of the prototype vectors is chosen to represent the
smallest dynamic patch within the encoded input z.
Formally, in Figure 2b, the prototype layer p computes m similarity scores:
p(z) = [ p1(z), p2(z), . . . , pm(z) ]
T (1)
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where, the similarity score between a prototype pj and z, denoted as pj(·) is given by
pj(z) = max
z′∈patches(z)
1
1 + ‖z′ − pj‖22
(2)
Fully-connected layer w(·): This layer computes weighted sums of similarity scores, a =W p(z),
where W ∈ RK×m are the weights, and K denotes the number of classes (K = 2 for DPNet). We
then use a softmax layer to compute the predicted probability as follows,
yˆi =
exp(ai)∑K
j=1 exp(aj)
. (3)
Note that, we allocate mk prototypes for each class k ∈ {0, 1} s.t.
∑
kmk = m. In other words,
every class is represented by mk prototypes in the final model.
Verification of dynamic prototypes via temporal logic: Our DPNet architecture allows for the
usage of formal methods to verify the robustness of our model. Given the direct computational
path from f to p to w, we can verify whether the learned prototypes satisfy some desired temporal
behaviors. Here, we used Timed Quality Temporal Logic (TQTL) similar to [13], but instead, we
consider each video as a data stream with each frame as a time-step. We hereby give a brief summary
of the TQTL language, and the specifications we used to verify our model.
Timed Quality Temporal Logic. The set of TQTL formulas φ over a finite set of Boolean-value
predicates Q over attributes of prototypes, a finite set of time variables (Vt), and a finite set of
prototype indexes (Vp) is inductively defined according to the following grammar:
φ ::= true |pi | ¬φ |φ1 ∨ φ2 |φ1Uφ2 |x ≤ y + n |x.φ | ∃pi@x, φ | (4)
where pi ∈ Q, and φ1 and φ2 are valid TQTL formulas. pi has the form pi ≡ fpi(t1...n, p1...m) ∼
C, where ∼ is a comparison operator, i.e. ∼∈ {<,≤, >,≥,=, 6=}, and C ∈ R. For example,
the predicate for "the similarity of prototype p1 to an input at time step 2 is greater than 0.9" is
f(t2, id1) > 0.9. We hereby use S(·) to denote the prototype similarity score.
In the grammar above, x, y ∈ Vt, n ∈ N, pi ∈ Vp, and U is the “until" operator. The time constraints
of TQTL are represented in the form of x ≤ y+ n. The freeze time quantifier x.φ assigns the current
time to a variable variable x before processing the subformula φ. The quantifiers ∃ and ∀ respectively
existentially and universally quantify over the prototype IDs in a given frame. In addition, we use
three additional operators: (ψ Implies φ) ψ → φ ≡ ¬ψ ∨ φ, (Eventually ψ) ♦ψ ≡ trueUψ, and
(Always ψ) ψ ≡ ¬♦¬ψ. The semantics of TQTL can be find in the Appendix B.
Specifications. We verify that if our model predicts fake for a testing video V , throughout the
video, there exists a clip at time t where a prototype pi ∈ Pfake is most similar to it compared to all
prototypes of the real class pk ∈ Preal for all time 0 ≤ t′ ≤ TV . This verifies the existence of a key
frame that our prototypes ‘see’ fake strongly. The formula φ1,key_frame denotes this specification:
φ1,key_frame = ♦(t.∃pk@t, Class(V ) = fake(real) ∧ pk ∈ Pfake(real)
→ (t′.((0 < t′ ∧ t′ < TV )
→ ∀pj@t′, pj ∈ Preal(fake) ∧ S(t, pk) > S(t′, pj) )))
Moreover, we specify that if a prototype is non-relevant, its similarity to a frame should be consistently
low across. An example of this safety specification is that a prototype representing a fake temporal
artifact should not be highly activated in a real video at any time. We specify this notion below,
where numerical values are user-specified thresholds that control the strictness of the specification:
φ2,non_relevance = (t.∀pi@t, Class(V ) = fake(real) ∧ pi ∈ Preal(fake)
→ S(t, pi) < 0.4 ∧(t′.(t ≤ t′ ∧ t′ ≤ t+ 5)
→ |S(t′, pi)− S(t, pi)| < 0.1))
3.2 Training procedure
We aim to learn meaningful latent representation which ensures that the prototype vectors a) are close
to the input video patches (fidelity), b) of different classes are well-separated (Separability), and c)
are interpretable by humans (grounded). We leverage previous works to incorporate appropriate loss
functions to enforce these [3, 27]. Furthermore, we also introduce a diversity loss term to ensure
that prototypes of the same class are non-overlapping. Specifically, we jointly optimize the feature
encoder f along with the prototype vectors p1,p2, . . . ,pm in the prototype layer p to minimize the
the cross-entropy loss on training set while regularizing for the desiderata.
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3.2.1 Loss function
Let D = {(xi, yi)}Ni=1 be our training dataset, where xi is our stacked input extracted from video vi.
Full objective. For hyperparameters λc, λs, and λd, our overall objective function that we wish to
minimize is given by
L(D; θ) = CE(D; θ) + λcRclus(D; θ) + λsRsep(D; θ) + λdRdiv(D; θ) (5)
where CE(·), Rclus(·), and Rsep(·) are the cross-entropy loss, clustering loss, and separation loss,
respectively. Here, θ are the trainable parameters for the feature encoder f and the prototype layer p.
The cross-entropy loss here imposes prediction accuracy and is given by
CE(D; θ) = 1N
∑N
i=1
∑K
k=1−1
[
yi = k
]
log(yˆk). (6)
The clustering loss Rclus minimizes the squared `2 distance between some latent patch within a
training image and its closest prototype vector from that class, and is given by
Rclus(D;p1,p2, . . . ,pm) = 1N
∑N
i=1minpj∈Pyi minz∈patches(xi) ‖z− pj‖22, (7)
where Pyi is the set of prototype vectors allocated to the class yi. The separation loss Rsep
encourages every patch of a training image to stay away from the prototypes not of its own class.
Rsep(D;p1,p2, . . . ,pm) = − 1N
∑N
i=1minpj 6∈Pyi minz∈patches(xi) ‖z− pj‖22. (8)
Similar loss functions have also been used in [11, 32].
Diversity loss: We propose a cosine similarity-based regularization term which penalizes prototype
vectors of the same class for overlapping with each other, given by
Rdiv(p1,p2, . . . ,pm) =
∑K
k=1
∑
i 6=j
pi,pj∈Pk
max(0, cos(pi,pj)− smax
)
, (9)
where cos(a,b) = a
>b
‖a‖·‖b‖ for vectors a and b is the cosine similarity, and smax is a hyperparameter
for the maximum similarity allowed. This cosine similarity-based loss considers the angle between
the prototype vectors regardless of their length. Hence, it allows us to penalize the similarity between
the prototypes up to a threshold, leading to diverse and more expressive representations.
3.2.2 Prototype projection and grounding
To achieve grounding, while training we intersperse the following projection step after every few
epochs. Specifically, we project the prototype vectors to actual video patches from training videos
that contain those dynamics as follows,
pj ← argminz′∈patches(f(xi)) ‖z′ − pj‖22 ∀i s.t. yi = k, (10)
for all prototype vectors of class k, i.e. pj ∈ Pk. This step projects each prototype vector of a given
class to the closest latent representation of a training video patch that is also from that same class.
As a result, the prediction of a test video is made based on the similarities it has with the learned
prototype vectors. Consequently, the test prediction is grounded on the training videos.
4 Evaluation
We discuss our evaluations of DPNet on benchmark deepfake datasets for prediction performance,
model interpretation, and robustness to temporal logic specifications.
4.1 Experimental settings
Table 1: Basic information for both FaceForensics++ and DeepFakeDetection datasets. [28]
Dataset Real Fake Avg. FPS Release Date
Video Frame Video Frame
FaceForensics++ (FF++) 1000 509.9k 1000 509.9k 26.7 2019.01
DeepFakeDetection (DFD) 363 315.4k 3068 2242.7k 24.0 2019.09
We use two benchmark deepfake datasets: FaceForensics++ (FF++) [38] and the Google/Jigsaw
Deepfake Detection dataset (DFD) [14]. Both FF++ and DFD are large-scale and contain manipulated
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Figure 3: The reasoning process of the DPNet. The prediction for each class is based on the evidence
between the dynamics of the input and a small set of dynamic prototypes. Best view as GIFs (See C).
Figure 4: Left column depicts the different classes of temporal artifacts and unnatural movements
found by DPNet across both DFD and FF++ datasets. Best view as GIFs (See C). The right column
shows the effect of diversity regularization (9) on prototype similarity scores across test videos.
and natural images of human faces (Table 1). Both datasets provide ground truth manipulation masks
showing what part of the face was manipulated. We use a standard preprocessing technique that
extracts frames and crops out facial areas from each video [56]. During DPNet training phases, the
input is formed by stacking 1 RGB frame followed by 8 pre-computed optical flow fields that are
uniformly separated. The input registers a temporal signature of roughly 1s for each dataset, which
should be sufficient to capture salient deepfake artifacts. DPNet uses a pre-trained ResNet101 as
a backbone network. Since our input contains temporal frames, we also perform cross-modality
pre-training. The encoder f and prototypes p were trained with learning rates of 1e−4 and 1e−3
respectively. From cross-validation, λc, λs, λd are set to (0.8, −0.8, 5.0). mk = 20, and prototype
vectors are randomly initialized. Further details of experiment settings are provided in Appendix A.
4.2 Comparison with state-of-the-art methods
In Table 2, we present the performance of DPNet on FF++ and DFD, as well as baselines that do not
have interpretable interpretations or temporal aspects. For binary classification, we report both the
accuracy, and more importantly the AUC. DPNet achieves 0.988 AUC on FF++ and 95.00% accuracy,
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Table 2: Test Accuracy and AUC on DFD and FF++ of DPNet and other baselines. Prototype overlap
percentage with ground truth manipulation masks are also provided in column 5. The - entries denote
numbers not reported in prior work, or non-applicability to the metric.
Dataset Method Binary Accuracy AUC Overlap(%) (%) (%)
FF++
Two-Stream (Zhou e al. 2017, [58]) - ' 70.01 -
Multi-Task Learning (Nguyen et al. 2019, [34]) - 76.30 -
MesoNet (Afcha et al. 2018, [1]) ' 93.00 - -
Capsule (Nguyen et al. 2019, [35]) 93.11 96.60 -
Xception (Rossler et al. 2019, [38]) ' 97.00 99.70 -
ProtoPNet (Chen et al. 2019, [11]) 92.00 96.22 83.67
DPNet, 40p (Ours) 95.00 98.75 94.82
DPNet, 80p (Ours) 96.25 98.20 92.99
DFD
ProtoPNet (Chen et al. 2019, [11]) 92.99 95.78 64.60
DPNet, 40p (Ours) 91.83 91.33 72.88
DPNet, 80p (Ours) 90.37 92.22 79.29
which is on par with existing state-of-the-art of 0.996 and 95.73% AUC achieved by ExceptionNet.
Note that ExceptionNet does not provide any form of intrinsic interpretability. Importantly, DPNet
outperforms ProtoPNet [11] by 0.025 in AUC and 3% in accuracy, while the interpretation of
DPNet’s prototypes aligns much closer with ground truths. We provide two settings with doubling
number of prototypes (m = 40, 80) per class. We also note that DPNet underperforms ProtoPNet
in predictive performance for DFD, but the gain in ground truth overlap percentage indicates that
perhaps ProtoPNet utilized background features that correlate with training labels but are not truly
discriminating.
Quantitative interpretation metric. We measure the interpretations against available ground truth
to determine what percentage each of the prototype’s prototypical patch overlaps with the ground
truth masks. Intuitively, each prototype looks at a prototypical patch within the input region and
uses those patches to make a prediction. Hence, we want to see how much each prototype actually
looks at our region of interest (the manipulated region). We use a state-of-the-art attribution method,
Integrated Gradients [44], to retrieve the pixel importance of each input with respect to the similarity
score of a prototype vector pj . We compute the overlap of the 95th percentile importance map
Ij , where values less than the threshold are set as 0, and 1 otherwise, with the binary mask of the
manipulated region M . Formally, each prototype computes a prototype percentage overlap (PPO):
PPOj =
|Ij ∩ M |
|Ij | (11)
Figure 5: Evaluation of the network’s explanations over ground truths. The PPOj score is averaged
for the top 10 most similar prototypes across the entire validation set, yielding our final PPO score
for each of the models.
Analysis. As seen in Table 2, DPNet outperforms ProtoPNet by at least 8 points across both datasets.
The added temporal information allows DPNet to capture important dynamics that cannot be learned
in other baseline methods that only process videos frame-by-frame. Not only do the prototypes in
our proposed approach focus more on the regions of interest, but the interpretations that we get from
these prototypes are more accessible and easier for humans to understand. Figure 4 visualize some of
the learned prototypes demonstrating unnatural movements and behaviors captured by DPNet.
Moreover, given the case-based reasoning nature of the network, it is easy to understand how each
similar prototype vector contributes to the final prediction. The final layer allows users to read off
the importance of each prototype to a testing image. Attention models, on the other hand, do not
follow case-based reasoning. It is possible to use posthoc analysis to get ‘prototypes’ like ours from
convolutional filters, but these are not faithful to the computation. DPNet ’s prototype vectors actually
participate in calculating the similarity scores combined in the final layer, which makes it more
understandable. Overall, although there exists some accuracy gap between DPNet and state-of-the-
arts, the added interpretability over videos instead of images brings richer explanations that are easy
for a layperson to understand, especially in this case of deepfakes.
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4.3 Visualization and interpretation of learned prototypes
We visualize the prototypes by taking the attribution with respect to each prototype similarity score.
During the training steps, while projecting, we kept track of the original training clip that is closest in
latent space to each prototype. Hence, during testing, we can visualize the prototypes that are most
similar to the testing videos.
Figure 3 visually represents how our network makes predictions based on examining the dynamics
withing the video and comparing that against the learned dynamics prototype. Figure 4 presents
classes of temporal artifacts captured by DPNet within the learned prototypes. One class of artifacts
features heavy discoloration Fig.4a, which is already interpretable as images, but changes of discol-
oration over time added interpretability. Other classes which feature more subtle discoloration or
movement Fig. 4b,c are harder to interpret with just one image, especially ones that feature subtle
facial jitterings and unnatural oscillations Fig. 4d. Hence, providing explanations that are dynamic
overtime stays faithful to the learned dynamic prototypes while increasing interpretability for end
users. Combined with the interpretable structure of the network, one can easily understand which
temporal artifacts are under scrutiny within an input deepfake video.
4.4 Temporal specifications over learned prototypes
Table 3: Percentage of traces satisfying tempo-
ral specifications. Rows in each block represent
the percentage over positive, negative, and all
traces.
φ1 φ2 φ3
ProtoPNet
95.23 49.73 70.89
89.09 42.18 58.76
92.00 45.75 64.50
DPNet,
40p
93.65 28.04 74.07
91.46 16.11 56.39
92.50 21.75 64.75
We checked the robustness of DPNet and inter-
pretable baselines against our temporal specifica-
tions specified in Table 3. Overall, both approaches
satisfy the φ1,key_frame specification up to high-
percentage, with DPNet performing slightly better,
especially with the fake traces. This indicates that
with high-probability, we can find a discriminative
prototype within the video that is most relevant in
explaining why a video is real or fake. On the other
hand, the models perform poorly with the stringent
specification φ2,non_relevance, which requires non-
relevant prototypes to both stay low and not change
at all over time. Since DPNet utilized temporal
information via optical flows, this is a stricter spec-
ification to enforce as flows can change drastically
across consecutive frames, hence the lower percentage of satisfying traces. We experiment by relaxing
the consecutive "next 5 frames" non-changing constraint, φ3,non_relevant,relaxed, which now only
enforce non-relevant prototype similarities to be low. The flexibility of temporal logic along with
interpretable model allows end-users to specify and enforce certain desiderata in their detection
framework. This further increases fairness, interpretability, and utilities of these frameworks.
5 Discussion and Conclusion
Summary We introduce DPNet – an interpretable deepfake detection technique which leverages
(and gives insight into) the temporal dynamics to determine if a given video is real or a deepfake.
In addition to the prototype-based interpretations, we draw motivations from the temporal logic
specifications in formal methods to design robustness metrics to analyze the decision-making process
of the underlying model. Our prototype layer along with the specifications can be used with other
deep fake detection models to interpret them and can be of independent interest.
Limitations and Future Work Incorporating temporal logic specifications provides a rich avenue
for future work on interpretability. To this end, it will be advantageous to learn the specifications
instead of designing them. This, however, is non-trivial and remains an open challenge in the literature
as prior work revolves around rule-mining via reducing to the boolean satisfiability problem [9]. As a
result, the present work shows one way to add logic-based interpretability via formal methods.
Conclusion The primary goal of transparency is to provide users with the tools and context to enable
them to make an informed decision. Another essential piece is to build trust into the decisions. To
this end, this present work aims to explain, in a human interpretable form and by logic specifications,
as to why and a determination was made, providing a safeguard against the misinformation spread
via deepfakes.
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Broader Impact
There is a growing need to use automatic deepfake detection models to detect and combat deepfakes.
However, a reliance on deepfake detectors places enormous trust on these models. This work aims to
help justify this trust by improving the interpretability of deepfake detection. In addition to model
interpretability, this work offers insights into what parts of deepfake videos can be used to discern
deepfakes, which may inform people how to detect deepfakes themselves. The risk of this work is
that its insights may ultimately be used to improve deepfake generators. Although improvements
in deepfake detection and generation may become a vicious cycle, this should not hinder research
on explaining deepfake detectors. For example, are already discussions on using deepfake detectors
to protect the videos of world leaders [2]. Model interpretations strengthen the accountability of
deepfake detectors. Our work takes a step towards exposing this problem and encourages future
research in explaining deepfake detectors.
References
[1] Darius Afchar, Vincent Nozick, Junichi Yamagishi, and Isao Echizen. Mesonet: a compact
facial video forgery detection network. CoRR, abs/1809.00888, 2018.
[2] Shruti Agarwal, Hany Farid, Yuming Gu, Mingming He, Koki Nagano, and Hao Li. Protecting
world leaders against deep fakes. In CVPR Workshops, 2019.
[3] David Alvarez-Melis and Tommi S. Jaakkola. Towards robust interpretability with self-
explaining neural networks. CoRR, abs/1806.07538, 2018.
[4] Irene Amerini, Leonardo Galteri, Roberto Caldelli, and Alberto Bimbo. Deepfake video
detection through optical flow based cnn. In CVPR Workshops, pages 1205–1207, 10 2019.
[5] Sebastian Bach, Alexander Binder, Grégoire Montavon, Frederick Klauschen, Klaus-Robert
Müller, and Wojciech Samek. On pixel-wise explanations for non-linear classifier decisions by
layer-wise relevance propagation. PLoS ONE, 10(7):e0130140, 07 2015.
[6] T. Baltrusaitis, A. Zadeh, Y. C. Lim, and L. Morency. Openface 2.0: Facial behavior analysis
toolkit. In 2018 13th IEEE International Conference on Automatic Face Gesture Recognition
(FG 2018), pages 59–66, 2018.
[7] Patricia Bouyer. Model-checking timed temporal logics. Electronic Notes in Theoretical
Computer Science, 231:323 – 341, 2009. Proceedings of the 5th Workshop on Methods for
Modalities (M4M5 2007).
[8] Sarah Cahlan. How misinformation helped spark an attempted coup in gabon. The Washington
Post, 2020.
[9] Alberto Camacho and Sheila A McIlraith. Learning interpretable models expressed in linear
temporal logic. In Proceedings of the International Conference on Automated Planning and
Scheduling, volume 29, pages 621–630, 2019.
[10] Nicholas Carlini and David A. Wagner. Towards evaluating the robustness of neural networks.
2017 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (SP), pages 39–57, 2017.
[11] Chaofan Chen, Oscar Li, Alina Barnett, Jonathan Su, and Cynthia Rudin. This looks like that:
deep learning for interpretable image recognition. CoRR, abs/1806.10574, 2018.
[12] J. Deng, W. Dong, R. Socher, L.-J. Li, K. Li, and L. Fei-Fei. ImageNet: A Large-Scale
Hierarchical Image Database. In CVPR09, 2009.
[13] Adel Dokhanchi, Hani Ben Amor, Jyotirmoy V. Deshmukh, and Georgios Fainekos. Evaluating
perception systems for autonomous vehicles using quality temporal logic. In Martin Leucker
and Christian Colombo, editors, Runtime Verification- 18th International Conference, RV 2018,
Proceedings, pages 409–416. Springer Verlag, January 2019.
[14] Nicholas Dufour, Andrew Gully, Per Karlsson, Alexey Victor Vorbyov, Thomas Leung, Jeremiah
Childs, and Christoph Bregler. Deepfakes detection dataset by google & jigsaw.
[15] Matthew B. Dwyer, George S. Avrunin, and James C. Corbett. Property specification patterns for
finite-state verification. In Proceedings of the Second Workshop on Formal Methods in Software
Practice, page 7–15, New York, NY, USA, 1998. Association for Computing Machinery.
9
[16] Christoph Feichtenhofer, Haoqi Fan, Jitendra Malik, and Kaiming He. Slowfast networks for
video recognition. CoRR, abs/1812.03982, 2018.
[17] Ian J. Goodfellow, Jonathon Shlens, and Christian Szegedy. Explaining and harnessing adver-
sarial examples. CoRR, abs/1412.6572, 2015.
[18] Sven Gowal, Krishnamurthy Dvijotham, Robert Stanforth, Rudy Bunel, Chongli Qin, Jonathan
Uesato, Relja Arandjelovic, Timothy A. Mann, and Pushmeet Kohli. On the effectiveness of
interval bound propagation for training verifiably robust models. ArXiv, abs/1810.12715, 2018.
[19] Karen Hao. An ai app that “undressed” women shows how deepfakes harm the most vulnerable.
MIT Technology Review, 2019.
[20] Xiaowei Huang, Marta Z. Kwiatkowska, Sen Wang, and Min Wu. Safety verification of deep
neural networks. In CAV, 2017.
[21] David Ingram. A face-swapping app takes off in china, making ai-powered deepfakes for
everyone. NBC, 2019.
[22] Guy Katz, Clark W. Barrett, David L. Dill, Kyle Julian, and Mykel J. Kochenderfer. Reluplex:
An efficient smt solver for verifying deep neural networks. ArXiv, abs/1702.01135, 2017.
[23] Been Kim, Cynthia Rudin, and Julie A Shah. The bayesian case model: A generative approach
for case-based reasoning and prototype classification. In Advances in Neural Information
Processing Systems, pages 1952–1960, 2014.
[24] Pavel Korshunov and Sébastien Marcel. Deepfakes: a new threat to face recognition? assessment
and detection. ArXiv, abs/1812.08685, 2018.
[25] Mathias Lécuyer, Vaggelis Atlidakis, Roxana Geambasu, Daniel Hsu, and Suman Jana. Certified
robustness to adversarial examples with differential privacy. 2019 IEEE Symposium on Security
and Privacy (SP), pages 656–672, 2018.
[26] Oscar Li, Hao Liu, Chaofan Chen, and Cynthia Rudin. Deep learning for case-based reasoning
through prototypes: A neural network that explains its predictions. CoRR, abs/1710.04806,
2017.
[27] Yuezun Li and Siwei Lyu. Exposing deepfake videos by detecting face warping artifacts. CoRR,
abs/1811.00656, 2018.
[28] Yuezun Li, Xin Yang, Pu Sun, Honggang Qi, and Siwei Lyu. Celeb-df: A large-scale challenging
dataset for deepfake forensics. arXiv: Cryptography and Security, 2019.
[29] Ji Lin, Chuang Gan, and Song Han. Tsm: Temporal shift module for efficient video understand-
ing. In Proceedings of the IEEE International Conference on Computer Vision, 2019.
[30] Aleksander Madry, Aleksandar Makelov, Ludwig Schmidt, Dimitris Tsipras, and Adrian Vladu.
Towards deep learning models resistant to adversarial attacks. ArXiv, abs/1706.06083, 2017.
[31] F. Matern, C. Riess, and M. Stamminger. Exploiting visual artifacts to expose deepfakes
and face manipulations. In 2019 IEEE Winter Applications of Computer Vision Workshops
(WACVW), pages 83–92, 2019.
[32] Yao Ming, Panpan Xu, Huamin Qu, and Liu Ren. Interpretable and steerable sequence learning
via prototypes. CoRR, abs/1907.09728, 2019.
[33] Grégoire Montavon, Wojciech Samek, and Klaus-Robert Müller. Methods for interpreting and
understanding deep neural networks. CoRR, abs/1706.07979, 2017.
[34] Huy H. Nguyen, Fuming Fang, Junichi Yamagishi, and Isao Echizen. Multi-task learning for
detecting and segmenting manipulated facial images and videos. CoRR, abs/1906.06876, 2019.
[35] Huy H. Nguyen, Junichi Yamagishi, and Isao Echizen. Capsule-forensics: Using capsule
networks to detect forged images and videos. CoRR, abs/1810.11215, 2018.
[36] Oded Padon, Jochen Hoenicke, Giuliano Losa, Andreas Podelski, Mooly Sagiv, and Sharon
Shoham. Reducing liveness to safety in first-order logic. Proc. ACM Program. Lang., 2(POPL),
December 2017.
[37] Ivan Petrov, Daiheng Gao, Nikolay Chervoniy, Kunlin Liu, Sugasa Marangonda, Chris Um’e,
Mr. Dpfks, RP Luis, Jian Jiang, Sheng Zhang, Pingyu Wu, Bo Zhou, and Weiming Zhang. Deep-
facelab: A simple, flexible and extensible face swapping framework. ArXiv, abs/2005.05535,
2020.
10
[38] Andreas Rössler, Davide Cozzolino, Luisa Verdoliva, Christian Riess, Justus Thies, and
Matthias Nießner. Faceforensics++: Learning to detect manipulated facial images. CoRR,
abs/1901.08971, 2019.
[39] Ekraam Sabir, Jiaxin Cheng, Ayush Jaiswal, Wael AbdAlmageed, Iacopo Masi, and Prem
Natarajan. Recurrent convolutional strategies for face manipulation detection in videos. CoRR,
abs/1905.00582, 2019.
[40] Ramprasaath R. Selvaraju, Abhishek Das, Ramakrishna Vedantam, Michael Cogswell, Devi
Parikh, and Dhruv Batra. Grad-cam: Why did you say that? visual explanations from deep
networks via gradient-based localization. CoRR, abs/1610.02391, 2016.
[41] Avanti Shrikumar, Peyton Greenside, and Anshul Kundaje. Learning important features through
propagating activation differences. CoRR, abs/1704.02685, 2017.
[42] Karen Simonyan, Andrea Vedaldi, and Andrew Zisserman. Deep inside convolutional networks:
Visualising image classification models and saliency maps. preprint, 12 2013.
[43] A Prasad Sistla. Safety, liveness and fairness in temporal logic. Formal Aspects of Computing,
6(5):495–511, 1994.
[44] Mukund Sundararajan, Ankur Taly, and Qiqi Yan. Axiomatic attribution for deep networks.
CoRR, abs/1703.01365, 2017.
[45] Christian Szegedy, Wojciech Zaremba, Ilya Sutskever, Joan Bruna, Dumitru Erhan, Ian J.
Goodfellow, and Rob Fergus. Intriguing properties of neural networks. CoRR, abs/1312.6199,
2014.
[46] Rob Toews. Deepfakes are going to wreak havoc on society. we are not prepared. Forbes, 2020.
[47] Rubén Tolosana, Rubén Vera-Rodríguez, Julian Fiérrez, Aythami Morales, and Javier Ortega-
Garcia. Deepfakes and beyond: A survey of face manipulation and fake detection. ArXiv,
abs/2001.00179, 2020.
[48] William Turton and Andrew Martin. How deepfakes make disinformation more real than ever.
Bloomberg News, 2020.
[49] Cristian Vaccari and Andrew Chadwick. Deepfakes and disinformation: Exploring the impact
of synthetic political video on deception, uncertainty, and trust in news. Social Media + Society,
6(1):2056305120903408, 2020.
[50] Marcell Vazquez-Chanlatte, Shromona Ghosh, Jyotirmoy V. Deshmukh, Alberto L. Sangiovanni-
Vincentelli, and Sanjit A. Seshia. Time series learning using monotonic logical properties.
CoRR, abs/1802.08924, 2018.
[51] Limin Wang, Yuanjun Xiong, Zhe Wang, Yu Qiao, Dahua Lin, Xiaoou Tang, and Luc Van
Gool. Temporal segment networks: Towards good practices for deep action recognition. CoRR,
abs/1608.00859, 2016.
[52] Shiqi Wang, Kexin Pei, Justin Whitehouse, Junfeng Yang, and Suman Jana. Efficient formal
safety analysis of neural networks. In Advances in Neural Information Processing Systems,
pages 6367–6377, 2018.
[53] Lily Weng, Pin-Yu Chen, Lam Nguyen, Mark Squillante, Akhilan Boopathy, Ivan Oseledets,
and Luca Daniel. PROVEN: Verifying robustness of neural networks with a probabilistic
approach. In Kamalika Chaudhuri and Ruslan Salakhutdinov, editors, Proceedings of the 36th
International Conference on Machine Learning, volume 97 of Proceedings of Machine Learning
Research, pages 6727–6736, Long Beach, California, USA, 09–15 Jun 2019. PMLR.
[54] Xin Yang, Yuezun Li, and Siwei Lyu. Exposing deep fakes using inconsistent head poses. CoRR,
abs/1811.00661, 2018.
[55] Matthew D. Zeiler and Rob Fergus. Visualizing and understanding convolutional networks.
CoRR, abs/1311.2901, 2013.
[56] K. Zhang, Z. Zhang, Z. Li, and Y. Qiao. Joint face detection and alignment using multitask
cascaded convolutional networks. IEEE Signal Processing Letters, 23(10):1499–1503, 2016.
[57] Bolei Zhou, Alex Andonian, Aude Oliva, and Antonio Torralba. Temporal relational reasoning
in videos. European Conference on Computer Vision, 2018.
[58] Peng Zhou, Xintong Han, Vlad I. Morariu, and Larry S. Davis. Two-stream neural networks for
tampered face detection. CoRR, abs/1803.11276, 2018.
11
[59] Jun-Yan Zhu, Taesung Park, Phillip Isola, and Alexei A. Efros. Unpaired image-to-image
translation using cycle-consistent adversarial networks. 2017 IEEE International Conference
on Computer Vision (ICCV), pages 2242–2251, 2017.
12
Appendix
A Experimental Settings
In this section, we discuss the experimental settings for our evaluations of DPNet on large-scale
deepfake datasets such as FaceForensics++ and Google’s DeepFakeDetection.
Datasets. The FaceForensics++ (FF++) dataset [38] is a subset of deepfake videos from the Technical
University of Munich and University Federico II of Naples’ FaceForensics benchmark consisting
of 1000 original video sequences sourced from YouTube and 1000 synthetic videos generated using
faceswap. All videos in FF++ mostly contain a trackable frontal face and manipulation masks are
also provided for synthetically generated videos.
The Google/Jigsaw DeepFake detection (DFD) [14] dataset consists of 3,068 deepfake videos
generated based on 363 original videos of 28 consented individuals of various ages, genders, and
ethnic groups. Pairs of actors were selected randomly and deep neural networks swapped the face of
one actor onto the head of another. The specific deep neural network synthesis model is not disclosed,
but manipulation masks are also provided in this dataset. The statistics for these datasets are provided
in the paper and below.
Dataset Real Fake Avg. FPS Release Date
Video Frame Video Frame
FaceForensics++ 1000 509.9k 1000 509.9k 26.7 2019.01
DeepFakeDetection 363 315.4k 3068 2242.7k 24.0 2019.09
Table 4: Basic information for both FaceForensics++ and DeepFakeDetection datasets. [28]
Pre-processing. We use the standard data pre-processing techniques for deepfakes and videos, i.e.
separating the frames from videos and cropping out facial areas using a face detection algorithm
MCTNN [56] instead of using the full-frame. When cropping faces, we use a face margin of 0.5-0.7
to get a full cropping of the head, and also use the detected boundaries to crop the mask videos.
Consecutive cropped frames are processed in OpenCV to calculate the dense optical flows.
Training details. During training, each input is formed by stacking 1 RGB frame with 8 pre-
computed optical flow fields starting from that RGB frame, stacking every 3 frames apart. Given the
FPS of the two datasets, FF++ and DFD, this registers a temporal signature of roughly 1.0s. The
initial input frame is randomly selected from the video each iteration. The selection process gives
our input dataloader a pseudo-augmentation aspect so the network does not overfit to any particular
segment of a video, but besides this, we do not use any other form of video data augmentations.
We used a pre-trained ResNet101 as the backbone of our architecture. However, given the shape of
our input, we also need to perform cross modality pre-training to initialize the weights of the first
convolutional layer, i.e we average the weights across the RGB channels and replicate this average
by the channel number of temporal network input [51]. Our network parameters θ are trained using
Adam, with a learning rate of 1e−4 for fω and 1e−3 for pi. We use a small number of prototypes
to represent facial features, hence we chose mk = 20. The learning rate decays by a factor of 0.5
every 10 epochs and the networks were trained for 150 epochs. We chosen our lambdas during
cross-validation and set λc, λs, λd to be (0.8, -0.8, 5.0). The values λc, λs are chosen from (.4, -.4),
(.6, -.6), (.8, -.8) and (1,-1). The value of λd is chosen from (1, 10).
Validation details. During validation, our model can perform frame-wise evaluation of the frames in
a video and aggregate the results. We follow the testing scheme of previous video detection work
[51] and sample 25 RGB frames and optical flows stack evenly spaced across deepfake videos. We
combine the logits using an aggregation function (sum or avg). This can be understood as combining
the similarity evidence between the learned prototypes and the testing video across clips in the video.
B TQTL Semantics
For completeness, we detailed the semantics for TQTL for evaluating a specification, similar to the
work by Dokhanchi et al. [13]. Consider the data stream D, i ∈ N is the index of current frame,
pi ∈ P , φ, φ1, φ2 ∈ TQTL and evaluation function  : Vt ∪ Vp → N, which is the environment over
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the time and prototype variables. The quality value of formula φ with respect to D at frame i with
evaluation  is recursively assigned as follows:J>K(D, i, ) := +∞JpiK(D, i, ) := Jfpi(j1, . . . , jn, id1, . . . , idn) ∼ cK(D, i, )Jx.φK(D, i, ) := JφK(D, i, [x⇐ i])J∃id@x, φK(D, i, ) := max
k∈P
(JφK(D, i, [id⇐ k]))
Jx ≤ y + nK(D, i, ) := { +∞ if (x) ≤ (y) + n−∞ otherwiseJ¬φK(D, i, ) := −JφK(D, i, )Jφ1 ∨ φ2K(D, i, ) := max (Jφ1K(D, i, ), Jφ2K(D, i, ))
Jφ1Uφ2K(D, i, ) := max
i≤j
(
min
(Jφ2K(D, j, ), min
i≤k<j
Jφ1K(D, k, )))
We say that D satisfies φ (D |= φ) iff JφK(D, 0, 0) > 0, where o is the initial environment. On the
other hand, a data stream D′ does not satisfy a TQTL formula φ (D′ 6|= φ), iff JφK(D, 0, 0) ≤ 0.
The quantifier ∃id@x is the maximum operation on the quality values of formula JφK corresponding
to the prototypes IDs at frame x.
C GIFs & Code
For the following visualizations and figures in the main paper, we have included the corresponding
gifs in folders within the supplementary materials. The authors are committed tno publicly release
code as open source for reproducibility for the camera-ready deadline.
D Additional Visualizations
D.1 More examples of prototypes and classes of temporal artifacts learned
Figure 6: Different classes of temporal artifacts and unnatural movements found by DPNet across
both DFD and FF++ datasets. Top block are fake prototypes and bottom are real prototypes. a) heavy
discolouration, b) subtle discolouration, c) subtle disappearance, d) unnatural movement, e) combined
eye-mouth movement, and f) head movement. Best view as GIFs.
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D.2 More examples of how DPNet classify a video
15
Figure 7: More examples of how DPNet classify a video. (a) and (b) are deepfakes, and (c) is genuine.
Best view as GIFs. The prediction for each class is based on the evidence between the dynamics of
the input and a small set of dynamic prototypes.
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